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EQUAL PROTECTION
US. CONST. amend XIV, § 1:
No State shall ... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the lmvs.
NY. CONST. art. I, § 11:
No person shall be denied the equal protection of
the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof
COURT OF APPEALS
D'Amico v. Crosson'
(decided March 25, 1999)
Pursuant to Judiciary Law section 221-d,2 Erie County Court
Judges were earning salaries of approximately $125,600 while the
Judges from Albany County earned 4.6 percent more with salaries
at approximately $131,400. 3 Challenging this disparity, the Judges
of the Erie County Court filed suit in October 1993 against
Matthew T. Crosson, as Chief Administrator of the Courts of the
State of New York and as Representative of the Administrative
Board of the Judicial Conference of the State of New York, et al.4
The Judges argued that their constitutional right of equal protection
was violated by the defendants who allowed the Judges of Erie
County to be paid less than the county court judges in Albany,
I 93 N.Y.2d 29,709 N.E.2d 465, 686 N.Y.S.2d 756 (1999).
2 N.Y. JUD. LAW § 221-d (Consol. 1997) prescribes and varies the salaries of
County Court judges in New York State based on geographical location.
3 Crosson, 93 N.Y. at 31, 709 N.E. 2d at 465, 686 N.Y.S. 2d at 757.
4 Id at 29, 709 N.E. 2d at 465, 686 N.Y.S. 2d at 756.
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Onondaga, and Sullivan Counties.' The New York Supreme Court
held that there was no rational basis for paying the Judges of Erie
County less in salary than the Judges in Albany County and
awarded the plaintiffs summary judgment relating to the cause of
action pertaining to Albany County.' Since Albany County Court
Judges were paid higher wages than those Judges of Onondaga and
Sullivan at the time of the decision of this case, the court held that
the causes of action relating to Onondaga and Sullivan Counties
were moot.
7
Crosson appealed to the Court of Appeals of New York pursuant
to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution8 and article 1, section 11 of the New York
Constitutiongcontending that the lower court erred in finding that
there was no rational basis for the existence of Judiciary Law
Section 221-d.' ° Crosson argued that the Judges cannot sustain
their burden of establishing that there is no rational basis for the
existence of the statute." He claimed that the level of review
required for constitutional validity of this statute was rational
relation analysis, Judiciary Law Section 221-d satisfied the test,
and it was therefore constitutionally valid.12 By providing evidence
regarding higher home values and larger judicial caseloads,
Crosson argued that he satisfied the rational basis of review by
showing that these higher salaries and larger judicial caseloads
' Crosson, 93 N.Y. at 31, 709 N.E. 2d at 465, 686 N.Y.S. 2d at 757.
6 Id.
7 id.
8 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in
pertinent part:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id.
9 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11. This section provides in pertinent part: "No person
shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision
thereof."
10 Crosson, 93 N.Y. at 31, 709 N.E.2d at 466, 686 N.Y.S.2d at 758.
l1 Id. at 32, 709 N.E. 2d at 467, 686 N.Y.S. 2d at 758.
12 Id.
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corresponded to the increased cost of living in that geographical
area and larger incomes. 3 The statute, therefore, serves a
legitimate state objective in accordance with the Equal Protection
Clause of the United States Constitution and the New York
Constitution. 4
The Court of Appeals began its analysis by stating that
under both the United States Constitution and the New York
Constitution, a statute that causes different treatment to a specific
class but does not target a suspect class nor infringes upon a
fundamental right, is subject to rational basis scrutiny whereby the
statute must be upheld if the classification scheme is rationally
related to a legitimate state objective. 5 Rational basis scrutiny is
the least rigorous level of judicial review requiring only the
showing of a rational relationship between the unequal treatment
and any legitimate state interest.' 6 A statute that is subject to the
rational basis scrutiny is presumed constitutional and the burden
lies on the challenger of the statute to prove that in fact no rational
relationship exists thereby invalidating the statute. The court
found that a statutory scheme, even if it results in the creation of
income disparities in different geographic areas, 'will not be
automatically struck down as being violative of equal protection.' 8
13 Id
14 Id
15 See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 113 S.Ct. 2637 (1993) and Henry v.
Milonas, 91 N.Y.2d 264,267,268,692 N.E.2d 554, 556, 669 N.Y.S.2d 523, 525
(1998). In Henry, the Court held that a differential of sixteen percent in the
median value of homes in Monroe and Ontario counties and the difference of
seventeen percent in per capita income between those two counties provided a
rational basis for a statutorily enacted salary disparity of approximately four
percent between County, Family, and Surrogate's Court Judges of Ontario and
Monroe Counties pursuant to N.Y. JuD. LAW §§ 221-d, 221-e, and 221-f.
'6 Crosson, 93 N.Y. 2d at 31,32,709 N.E.2d at 467, 686 N.Y.S.2d 757,758.
" Id See also Henry at 268, 692 N.E.2d at 556, 669 N.Y.S.2d at 525 and
Maresco v. Cuomo, 64 N.Y.2d 242, 250-251,475 N.E.2d 95, 98, 485 N.Y.S.2d
724, 728 (1984). In Maresco, the Court upheld the challenged legislation since
the plaintiff judges failed to prove that no rational relationship existed between
the State constitutional and statutory requirements that certain judges of the
State retire at age 70 and a legitimate state objective.
"s In the Matter of Tolub, 58 N.Y.2d 1, 8, 444 N.E.2d 1, 4, 457 N.Y.S.2d 751,
754 (1982). In Tolub, the Court held that the computation of the salaries of law
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The statute will be found constitutional if the state had a rational
basis for making such a distinction. 9
The New York State courts have adopted and applied the
rational basis test in two cases involving judicial salary disputes
with opposite results.20 In Cass v. State of New York, the court
upheld the provisions of the Unified Court Budget Act which
compensated New York City judges differently than others within
the state by basing their classification scheme on differences in
population, case load, and cost of living.2 In Weissman v. Evans,
however, the court found that there was no rational basis for wage
disparity between the judges of Suffolk County compared with the
judges from Nassau County.' The court found that the jurisdiction,
practice, and procedures of both classes of judges were nearly
identical and indistinguishable and therefore no legitimate state
interest was found to exist.'
Courts, as in Heller v. Doe,24 are compelled to accept generalized
legislation even if it appears that there is an imperfect match
assistants serving in the Unified Court System was not arbitrary or capricious
and although it resulted in some disparity between the salaries paid to employees
formerly paid by the State and employees formerly paid by the local government
and certain disparities among law assistants in certain geographic areas, the
fiscal constraints of the State provide a rational basis for the classification.
19 Id.
20 See Cass v. State of New York, 58 N.Y.2d 460, 448 N.E.2d 786, 461
N.Y.S.2d 1001 (1983) and Weissman v. Evans, 56 N.Y.2d 458,438 N.E.2d 397,
452 N.Y.S.2d 864 (1982).
21 Cass, 58 N.Y.2d at 464,448 N.E.2d at 787, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 1002.
22 Weissman, 56 N.Y.2d at 466,438 N.E.2d at 401,452 N.Y.S.2d at 868.
' Id. Compare with Cass v. State, 58 N.Y.2d at 464, 448 N.E.2d at 787, 461
N.Y.S.2d at 1002.
24 509 U.S. 312 (1993). In Heller, the State of Kentucky promulgated a statute
that treated the mentally retarded differently than the mentally ill. The statute
authorized the involuntary commitment of the mentally retarded on a clear and
convincing standard of proof while committing the mentally ill required only
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Also, the statute permitted close relatives and
guardians of the mentally retarded to participate in commitment proceedings
while prohibiting such participation of close relatives and guardians of the
mentally ill. The state defended the statute and claimed the existence of a
legitimate state interest. The state argued that the mentally retarded are easier to
diagnose than the mentally ill and that mental retardation is a permanent
condition whereas mental illness is unpredictable and the behavior of the
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between the statute and its intended goal.' In Heller, the State of
Kentucky created a statute that treated the mentally retarded
differently than the mentally ill.' By differentiating between the
care required for each of the two groups, the United States
Supreme Court held that the State of Kentucky more than
adequately justified the difference in treatment among the two
classifications, thereby satisfying their burden of rational basis
review and validating the statute.' The Court stressed that rational
relation review, in the absence of a fundamental right infringement
and suspect classification scheme, does not authorize the Court "to
sit as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of
legislative policy determinations made in areas that neither affect
fundamental rights nor proceed along suspect lines."' As a result,
the legislators in creating statutes need not articulate at any time
the purpose or rationale for supporting its classification.29 Instead,
a classification must be upheld against equal protection challenge
if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could
provide a rational basis for the classification. 0
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision in Crosson and held
that the Judiciary Law Section 221-d, which prescribes the salary
ranges of the judges of the county courts based on geographical
location, need only pass rational relation review and that the data
submitted by the defendants regarding their higher home values
and larger caseloads was sufficient in meeting this requirement.3'
The Judiciary Law Section 221-d was therefore presumed
constitutional and the Judges failed in their burden to prove the
lack of any rational relationship between their lower salaries and
the higher home values and larger case loads of the defendants.'
mentally ill can change. As a result, the state argued that different treatments are
required for each classification.
25 l
26 Id
27 Id
2 Heiler, 509 U.S. at 319 (quoting New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
29 Id at320.
30 Crosson, 93 N.Y. at 32,709 N.E. 2d at 466,686 N.Y.S. at 758.
31 Id
32 Id
2000 559
5
Fiorelli: D'Amico v Crosson
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2000
TOURO LAW REVIEW
The court reasoned that the data supplied by the defendants
explained the disparate treatment based on geography created by
the statute.33
In sum, New York law has incorporated the rational basis test
from federal law into its own state constitution. Under both
constitutions, if the classification scheme being challenged does
not target a suspect class and does not infringe upon a fundamental
right, the statute at issue is presumed constitutional until the
challenger provides evidence that in fact no rational relationship
exists between the classification and a legitimate state interest.
This rational basis level of review maintains the absence of the
courts from interfering with the legislature in creating statutes.
Donna Fiorelli
33 Id.
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